Gaza ceasefire will leave fundamental issues unresolved

Both Israel and Hamas may become trapped in a bloody mess from which they cannot escape. 

The Israel-Hamas war is a painful example of how failures of policy on all sides can allow a simmering conflict to ignite into all-out war. After two weeks of heavy fighting, world leaders have been roused to greater diplomatic activity, but the two sides show no sign of heeding outside calls for a truce. The war is in an uncertain phase which could lead in a number of directions.

Hundreds of Palestinians are being killed and thousands wounded in the Israeli offensive. The Gazan people have insufficient food and water, while the lack of power and supplies means hospitals cannot properly treat patients. Humanitarian agencies and the UN therefore seek an immediate ceasefire with the basic aim of saving lives. Unfortunately the position of the key actors is so entrenched that this humanitarian imperative is currently being ignored.

Both the Israelis and Hamas have an appetite for further fighting, partly because of deep hostility to the other and partly because to stop would mean defeat and a ceasefire on unfavourable terms. Israel feels its assault has been largely successful and remains committed to inflicting maximum damage on Hamas while it has the opportunity.

The US is the only external party holding real leverage on Israel but it blames Hamas for the crisis and remains content for the Israeli operation to continue. The inactivity of the Bush administration in its final days merely confirms its ineffectiveness in addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict. The new US administration is likely to re-engage with greater energy but it hard to see President Obama taking risks with the special Israeli relationship in a meaningful push for a comprehensive settlement.

Should a ceasefire be agreed shortly by diplomatic means, it is probable that the fundamental issues at the root of the conflict will be unresolved - Hamas will maintain the intention and capacity to fire rockets while Israel will maintain its longstanding blockade of the Gaza Strip. As with the fragile peace between Israel and Hizbullah in Lebanon, the possibility of future conflict will remain.

Alternatively, Hamas may be so battered that it surrenders and Israel wins this war. This Israeli attack is the heaviest it has inflicted on Palestinians since 1967 and there is huge disparity between the combatant sides. Hamas also lacks outside friends, has been largely isolated for years and is strongly opposed by many Palestinians.

However, for Hamas to give in would be counter to the nature of a movement which is built on resistance and steadfastness. Hamas does not necessarily mind facing overwhelmingly bad odds and sees value in simply surviving the attack by a massive military power. Some in the movement will also welcome the chance to engage the Israelis in urban guerrilla-style fighting in Gaza.

Israel has expressed its objectives in minimalist terms, having learned hard lessons from its war with Hizbullah in 2006 in which it could not achieve its over-ambitious goals. The Israeli aims are to reduce the level of rocket fire and to weaken Hamas to a position where it is forced to accept a ceasefire on tougher terms. Israel hopes that these terms - chiefly no Gazan military attacks and an end to arms smuggling across the Egyptian border - will ensure much greater security for its population living near Gaza.

For all the Israeli destruction and killing, a reduction in Palestinian rocket fire is still not certain. Israel hopes that by the sheer strength of its deployment and its announcement that the operation is open-ended, Hamas will see the futility of its struggle and will break first.

However, if Hamas proves to be as stubborn and resilient as in the past, it may not accept a ceasefire for some time, leaving Israel with a tough choice between carrying on, inflicting more civilian casualties and humanitarian suffering, or pulling out in what would be regarded as a disappointing, even humiliating step backwards. The former strategy would attract much firmer international criticism, while the latter would be deeply unpopular within Israel as the campaign would effectively have failed.

Hamas' goal is to maintain its resistance until Israel is so exhausted or pressured that it agrees a truce on equal terms. Hamas cannot defeat Israel in this war but it could claim victory in such a scenario given the imbalance between the two sides.

A bleak but possible prospect is that by refusing to flinch first, Israel and Hamas become trapped in a bloody mess from with neither can easily escape and in which civilians continue to suffer. The failed records of both parties and of international actors is not encouraging.

Robert Lowe is Programme Manager and Research Fellow of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, a UK thinktank. This article was first published in The Big Issue. 

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