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TechnoratiHuman dignity, what a stupid idea!
At least, that’s what a psychology professor at Harvard thinks.
In the minds of most
people, human dignity is a cornerstone of bioethics. After all, bioethics was
partly inspired by horrific abuses of human dignity by Nazi doctors. To protect
it, the new United Nations ratified in 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. This recognised "the inherent dignity and... the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family". And nearly 40
national constitutions ratified since World War II have referred explicitly to
human dignity. Like life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, human dignity
is one of those notions that is part of the air we breathe.
But not, it turns out, the air breathed by professional bioethicists. In fact, low-intensity academic warfare is sputtering along over a 2003 proposal by Ruth Macklin, at Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New York, that "human dignity" (scare quotes essential) should be junked. This doesn’t mean that she wanted to ill-treat people. Rather, she regarded the two words as highfalutin baggage smuggled in from religion which can and should be discarded. They were either too vague to be meaningful or they simply restated other notions, such as respect for autonomy or capacity for rational thought.
The controversy provoked the President’s Council for Bioethics, a government study group set up by President Bush, to respond with a fat book of essays which, for the most part, defend the disputed notion. And this in turn provoked Steven Pinker to rebut it in the most influential opinion journal in the US, The New Republic, under the inflammatory headline, "The Stupidity of Dignity".
If you haven’t heard of Steven Pinker, you obviously don’t read the New York Times much. He is one of America’s top public intellectuals, with a number of best-selling books on how the mind and language work to his credit. Back in 2004 Time magazine called him one of the 100 most influential people in the world. He is also a professor of evolutionary psychology at Harvard University, which gives his theory even more weight. And this theory, repeated over and over in his writings, is that "the mind is what the brain does". This is more or less the theme of his book, How the Mind Works. It is an increasing popular view among neuroscientists.
Surprisingly for a distinguished academic, most of what Pinker had to say was more or less personal abuse. He attacked the Council as a body stacked with Catholic "theocons" and led by a conservative Jew, Leon Kass, whom he calls "pro-death" and "anti-freedom". It all sounded a bit like Rush Limbaugh on Hillary Clinton. But I admit that I became seriously disturbed when Pinker quoted Kass's severe condemnation of the practice of licking ice cream cones in public places as inconsistent with human dignity. No way José. Triple-scoop raspberry sherbets are not something I am going to give up, even for the sake of human dignity.
Thankfully, though, I took a deep breath and read on. Dr Kass is the author of numerous books and his views on ice cream must have come from one of them, but they did not appear in the Council’s collection of essays. Pinker had been beating America's leading defender of "human dignity" over the head with a red herring, which is even more undignified than slurping in public.
No doubt there is a personal element in this dust-up. This is not the first clash between the two scholars. Writing in the journal Commentary last year, Kass's defence of a non-materialist account of human nature against the Harvard academic was scathing: "One hardly knows which is the more impressive, the height of Pinker’s arrogance or the depth of his shallowness... he does not understand that the empowering organization of materials -- the vital form -- is not itself material." Perhaps Pinker was still feeling the sting of the lash.
Eventually, however, Pinker’s spleen dribbled away and he came to grips with "human dignity" itself. He criticised it for being relative (some people find public consumption of ice cream dignified), fungible (colonoscopies are undignified and we willing endure them), and harmful (think of Saddam Hussein’s highly dignified military parades). Human dignity, it seems, is a nasty business. It puts us at risk of being arrested by "the ice cream police" for perfectly acceptable things like therapeutic cloning. Why rabbit on about the "squishy, subjective notion" of dignity when you can jog along perfectly well with clear, sharp-edged ideas like autonomy and respect for persons?
Come again?
While “human dignity” is an idea which certainly requires extensive clarification and precise definition, “respect for persons” and “autonomy” are as squishy as a wet sponge. I would have thought that a Harvard prof would be more discerning. For instance, are dolphins or chimpanzees “persons”, too? Should Japanese fishermen be jailed for violating the person rights of minke whales? And is a sleeping person autonomous? A comatose person? A two-day-old infant?
Along with human dignity, Pinker seems to have jettisoned 2,500 years of non-materialist Western philosophy. Man, homo sapiens, is an animal, but in the words of Aristotle, he is a rational animal. Any analysis of man which fails to take into account his evident non-material capacity for beauty, or abstraction, or dreams of the future will inevitably put human dignity between scare quotes. Pinker, astonishingly, is virtually blind to philosophical discourse. This explains why he zeroes in on Kass’s scandalous opinions on ice cream cones and ignores his defence of man’s capacity for "reason, freedom, judgment, and moral concern”. Dialoguing with Pinker about human dignity is rather like discussing the chemistry of H2O with someone who doesn’t believe in oxygen.
When I began to read Pinker’s article, I was filled with foreboding about the future of bioethics. But by the end, I realized that it was far from bad news. If the best way to construct a philosophical defence of therapeutic cloning, for instance, is to throw “human dignity” overboard, people will think twice about it. While ridiculing human dignity may raise a few chuckles in the Harvard Faculty Club, it will never play in Peoria. Denigrating human dignity is a brain wave without a future.
Michael Cook is editor of MercatorNet.
Paul Michael and kaltrosomos, allow me to quote from Stephen Hawking’s Brief History of Time, chapter 10:
“Of course, one could say that free will is an illusion anyway. If there really is a complete unified theory that governs everything, it presumably also determines your actions. But it does so in a way that is impossible to calculate for an organism that is as complicated as a human being. The reason we say that humans have free will is because we can’t predict what they will do.”
The idea of determinism employed by LaPlace requires this refinement: although the future of a system may not be known precisely, even given a precise knowledge of its prior state, such knowledge is available up to a probability distribution. In other words, the future is knowable, except for random variation. That’s very different from free will in the classical sense, because what a person decides to do should not be predictable, even up to random variation. It may indeed be the case that some choices are random, and even some moral choices (of whether to do good or bad) are random, but in that case they are devoid of moral content, i.e. the choices do not have an associated responsibility. If everyone had to made choices by throwing dice, they could not be blamed for the numbers that came up or the choices these random outcomes implied.
I hope this help clear up some of the confusion.
Great commentary on Pinker’s diatribe in the New Republic. I thought that Pinker attack on the Bioethics Council was sophomoric. First, he builds his case for a new Catholic Inquisition then he states:
“To be fair, most of the chapters in the Dignity volume don’t appeal directly to Catholic doctrine, and of course the validity of an argument cannot be judged from the motives or affiliations of its champions.”
He basically, refutes the first half of his essay. Then he proceeds to set up and knock down several straw men and never seriously engage any of the writers. He confuses dignity with other concepts such as honor, pride and courtesy.
Most revealing is his argument that dignity is an illusion. Interestingly, Pinker wants to rest his bioethics on autonomy. Autonomy implies a free will. Yet, in his books he argues that free will is an illusion as well.
He ends his essay with a familiar false choice. Respecting human dignity will slow biomedical research and cost millions of lives. Such a proposition strikes me as cannibalistic. Moreover, the same could just as easily be said about Pinker’s hallowed respect for autonomy.
In viewing the above discussion, I felt I was watching a game of dodgeball. Kaltrosomos asks for citations on the claim of general agreement that free will is not material in origin. Fr. Gearhart quotes one individual (Hawking) on scientific determinism, then infers Hawking’s rejection of free will without additional attribution. Okay so far. But inferring a step further - that Hawking (or anybody else)- generally accepts that free will must then originate from a non-material source? I don’t see a citation for that claim. I would expect multiple citations to be proffered for a claim of general acceptance.
Next, we are cautioned that these are highly technical matters (don’t try thinking about this at home!), and a PhD in mathematics assures us that the mathematics of chaos and randomness are separate. Leaving aside the appeal to one’s own authority (rather to logic), are we to accept that because descriptive mathematics can create probability distributions (such as for weather patterns, or the position of an electron in an orbital) that these distributions are deterministic? Last time I checked, probability was just that - a likelihood of an event, not a guarantee. Do clear me up on this if I’ve gotten it jumbled.
I don’t endorse or reject the idea of a non-material origin for free will. I just don’t see it supported in the above argument.
John Thomas,
Meaning is a human construct. Who else talks about meaning but us? At this point, we know of no other intelligent races that concerns themselves with meaning.
You seem to be making a strawman by insisting that the materialist philosophy MUST be one of futility, despair, etc. Why must you insist when somebody like my disagrees that I’m suffering under an illusion? You aren’t distinguishing between objective meaninglessness and the subjective. I see no conflict in objective meaninglessness and persons finding subjective meaning. I agree that in the face of the universe it does seem absurd, but hey, we could all use a few more laughs couldn’t we? and even if it is absurd that doesn’t make it worth less. It merely shows how small i am in the face of the wide world, and encourages me to be good-humored and try my best to make friends with my fellows since the universe itself doesn’t give a damn.
Also, If believing in both materialism and purpose/meaning/ etc, is an illusion, why do I have both? Are you going to suggest that i *don’t really* have both? that I’m lacking in one or the other, even though I feel I have both? That isn’t very convincing.
Fr.Gearhart,
You say the randomness of phenomena at the quantum level is fully characterized by probability distributions, as well as that it is mostly probabilities that average out, rather than chaos.
But I still don’t see how that leaves “no room for free will, in the sense of responsible moral agency.”
Perhaps I misunderstand you. Are you saying that, even with quantum events taken into account, you see a material universe as wholly deterministic? Why do you think that? If at the quantum level events are not concretely determined but mere probabilities, how can you say that is deterministic?
As to the soul, what other perspective do you suggest besides the intellectual one when considering it?
My explanation for it isn’t exactly new. I think the soul is just another word for the interactions between body and mind, thoughts and emotions. All these are material. I don’t know exactly what role quantum events play in the mind, but I think, based entirely on my own opinion, that they do play a role in creating our free will. Other organisms have not had nervous systems as developed as ours, thus reducing the amount of influence that quantum events can have. But human minds are home to billions of neurons and their connections, and if each of these individual connections and neurons is even slightly influenced by quantum events, then an element of indeterminacy enters into the mind. this indeterminacy doesn’t survive at the level of thoughts, where the individual probabilities average out into patterns and order. But this indeterminacy has created the possibility of choice for individual humans.
We see various levels of free agency in other animals, such as dogs and cats, apes and gorillas. They too have advanced nervous systems, but not quite as complex as ours. the more complex nervous systems become, the greater the influence of quantum events becomes. a side-effect of this is free will and agency. that’s my view.
kaltrosomos, I assure you we are dealing with highly technical issues, here. I should first point out that the mathematics of randomness and the mathematics of chaos are completely distinct, and the two phenomena must not be conflated in our understanding. Second, whether any natural phenomenon is random or chaotic, it is, nevertheless, both in principle and in practice, reducible to mathematical formulation. The chaos of weather patterns is fully characterized by non-linear partial differential equations. The randomness of phenomena at the quantum level is fully characterized by probability distributions. The averaging you speak of is primarily an averaging of probabilities, not an averaging of chaos.
Either way, there is no room for free will, in the sense of responsible moral agency.
LaPlace once said of God, “Je n’avais pas besoin de cette hypothese.” Meaning, “I have no need of that hypothesis.” Undoubtedly you feel the same way about the soul. Both seem to be overkill as an explanation to people who are disinclined to accept them. I don’t blame you. From a purely intellectual perspective, the hesitancy to accept a highly complex explanation for a highly problematic phenomenon is understandable. I am happy to consider other possibilities, should you choose to introduce any. I should point out, however, that these issues are not at all simple to deal with, and only very seldomly treated intelligently in the literature.
But - Kaltrosomos - If it’s true that the “universe [is] inherently meaningless and objectively pointless”, then all of everything, including any kind of “ ... meaning we give our own lives ...” would itself be meaningless, pointless, illusiory, and absurd (why? for what?). To think you can have materialism, and also meaning/meaningfulness/purpose, is an illusion (conforting no doubt, but illusiory all the same).
But I’m not convinced that the material is purely deterministic. I think there is a very real possibility, judging from quantum events, that at a small enough level all events are chaotic, indeterminate.
These events, though individually random, eventually average into patterns. Chaos, it seems, cannot stay pure forever. Order and patterns creep in. So at a very small level the material is indeterminate, while at our level of perception the chaos has averaged out into discernible patterns.
If the universe is at base indeterministic, i see no problem with saying both that humans have free will and that the material is all there is.
Further, your bringing the soul into it makes more problems than it solves. First, if the soul interacts with the body, wouldn’t it be detectable by material means? If it is not detectable by any means, how can you say this soul really has any effect at all? It must be able to connect with the material in order to have an effect, and if it has an effect it should be detectable. The same goes for all supernatural events. But I do not think any definitive finding of this non-material ‘soul’ has yet been made.
Pinker is near the ultimate conclusion of a reductionist materialistism. As Fr. Larry Gearhart says in the comment above, if one believes humanity is reducible to mathematical equations then the abstract notion of human dignity must seem absurd
kaltrosomos, in a fascinating and engaging interview with “Yair Lapid”, Stephen Hawking declared, “The basic assumption of science is scientific determinism.” Although he does not define what this means in the interview, and although he doesn’t relate it directly to the problem of free will,” As a Ph.D. mathematician, I can tell you what “scientific determinism” means. It means that all interaction is reducible to mathematical equations. The physical nature of a human being is that he is an assemblage of molecules and various kinds of stored energy. If there is no human soul, a non-material component to his nature, everything about him is predictable, up to purely random factors. Everyone who studies physics knows this. People like Stephen Hawking, who has a rather religious concept of physical law, believe that nothing can violate scientific causality, and therefore free will is an illusion.
If a human being has a non-material soul that interacts with the body (including the mind) through a miraculous impingement upon material reality, then it is possible for free will to exist. Otherwise, not.
If you can appreciate the significance of this, we can then move on to the question of the pointlessness of a purely material reality.
Larry:
“By contrast, there is some general agreement that the nature of human consciousness is more elusive, and free will is decidedly not material in origin (if it is real).”
Could you cite some sources for saying that there’s general agreement that free will is not material in origin? I wasn’t aware that this was a general view, so where did you hear it?
Also, I don’t see anything terribly wrong with considering the universe inherently meaningless and objectively pointless. The universe can take care of itself. It’s what we do with ourselves that matters, isn’t it? The meaning we give our own lives should be the most important.
Michael Cook is right about the difficulty of having a serious discussion with someone whose understanding of human nature is limited to a material perspective. The enterprise, however, is not entirely hopeless. Unfortunately, the prospects for serious people to come together in mutual understanding about the philosophical issues involved may take decades to show measurable progress. Real dialog will take more than “making nice”. It will require addressing difficult foundational questions.
To take a couple of examples. It is technically difficult, if not impossible, to show that the “rational” nature of man, by itself, implies a non-material basis. Computer science has made significant strides in demonstrating the potential for computational “reason” in its many varieties, notably including logic and the discernment of patterns. By contrast, there is some general agreement that the nature of human consciousness is more elusive, and free will is decidedly not material in origin (if it is real).
Natural law philosophers all know the foundations of society rest upon their tradition, but materialist philosophers have a great deal of difficulty confronting this issue in all its implications. Instead, they seem to take refuge in some form of what they consider “existential courage.” The inherent futility and pointlessness of a purely material reality doesn’t seem to have fully registered on them. At least I’ve never been able to draw any materialist philosopher into a full exploration of this issue.
Your arguments can find a lot of support from Charles Taylor’s book, A Secular Age, which I am in the process of reviewing for Mercatornet. The book does a magnificent job of showing the complex derivation of the many different strands that make up our current “social imaginary,” the mix of religious and secular hand-me-downs and build-us-ups that form the context of current discourse about social ethical issues. Villains and heroes are distributed regularly on both sides of the religious/secular divide. Depending on which facts one chooses, either side can be made to appear shallow, intolerant and uncomprehending. The beauty of Taylor’s book is that the richness of his wide-ranging search for the historical origins of the current social imaginary should put an end, among all serious thinkers who are not in the thrall of prejudice, to the practice of viewing religiously derived ideas (a notion of dignity not reducible to autonomy or capacity for rational thought being one of them) as not worthy of entry into public discourse.
Randal Marlin
What Herminio Martins said is an understatement.
This is a splendid piece. I am so glad it has been written and published, It deserves wide notice. The author and the site are to be commended.
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